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A Historian's View of the International Freedom of Expression
Framework
Antoon De Baets
The international freedom of expression framework as established by
the United Nations in recent decades has been the accumulated and
sophisticated result of philosophical and legal thinking since the
Enlightenment, if not earlier. The framework is an integral part of the
international human rights system and it is shared almost worldwide, albeit
with some regional variations. It is common inside legal circles, but less
well-known outside of it. This is regrettable as the framework provides
standards to discuss the merits of different law types and offers criteria to
evaluate arguments in discussions about free expression, information and
secrecy. Scholars outside the legal realm need to develop their own reading
of it. Therefore, I shall approach it here, by way of illustration, from the
particular angle of my own profession, history. It goes without saying that
many history-related remarks are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other
scholarship as well. I provide only an outline of the framework, although
many of its parts merit in-depth treatment.
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The Standards
The standards that regulate the universal right to freedom of opinion and
expression on a global scale are written down in articles 19 and 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR is a
formal elaboration of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It
was approved by the United Nations in 1966 and as of June 2016 ratified by
168 states (representing 80% of the world population).1 Article 19.1
describes the formation of opinions, article 19.2 their expression, article 19.3
their restriction, and article 20 their prohibition.
Article 19 ICCPR:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

See http:// indicators.ohchr.org. Countries that have not yet ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) include China, Cuba, Malaysia, Myanmar and
Saudi Arabia.
1
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
Article 20 ICCPR
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited
by law.

If we are to interpret these two articles, we need the guidance of the
Human Rights Committee, a United Nations body established in 1976 to
supervise compliance with the ICCPR by the states parties (the ratifying
states). One of the Committee’s tasks is to issue authoritative
interpretations of the various ICCPR articles. In 2011, it produced a General
Comment on article 19, which will be our main guide here. 2 In introducing
the freedoms of opinion and expression, the Committee recalled why they
are so important for individuals, for society and for the state:
[They] are indispensable conditions for the full development of the
person…They constitute the foundation stone for every free and
democratic society… Freedom of expression is a necessary condition
for the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability
that are, in turn, essential for the promotion and protection of human
rights.3
Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 34 [on the freedoms of opinion and
expression) (2011). The principal drafter of this General Comment was HRC member
Michael O’Flaherty, professor at the National University of Ireland in Galway. General
Comment 34 replaces General Comment 10 [on freedom of expression] (1983). See also
General Comment 11 [on the prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial
or religious hatred] (1983).
3
HRC, General Comment 34, §§2–3.
2
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If we read these rationales with the eyes of the historian, we note that
the idea of history is tacitly but completely immersed in them in two
respects. First, everyone needs to somehow reflect on the past in order to
achieve full personal development. Second, history as a craft, as long as it is
done responsibly, helps foment a democratic society, among others because
historical information can inform important political debates and therefore
contribute to achieving government transparency and accountability. 4

Article 19.1: The Formation of Opinions
Article 19.1 establishes the right to hold opinions. Two principles
underpinning its logic are of utmost importance to historical writing. The first
is the right to form and hold historical opinions (that is, interpretations of
past events and moral judgments about the conduct of historical figures).
The Human Rights Committee observed:
Paragraph 1 of article 19 requires protection of the right to hold
opinions without interference. This is a right to which the Covenant
permits no exception or restriction … All forms of opinion are
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or
religious nature.5
This commentary emphasizes the absolute and non-derogable right to
hold opinions, including those of a historical nature. The second principle is
the non-coercion principle. In the words of the Committee:
Antoon De Baets, “Democracy and Historical Writing,” Historiografías / Historiographies no.
9 (June 2015): 31–43, https://unizar.es/historiografias/numeros/9/debaets.pdf
5
HRC, General Comment 34, §9.

4
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Any form of effort to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion
is prohibited.6
Coercion is inconsistent with the freedom to hold opinions. In other words,
from a human rights perspective, historians are not obliged to adopt the
interpretations of past events or the moral judgments about the conduct of
historical figures made by others; and citizens in general are not obliged to
comply with a duty to remember imposed on them by others. 7

Article 19.2: The Expression of Opinions
Whereas article 19.1 focuses on the individual as such, article 19.2
focuses on the individual in a social context. It establishes the right to
freedom of information and expression. This is a right of persons looking for
information and ideas (“seek”), persons expressing opinions (“impart”), and
the public interested in hearing them (“receive”). Here, a third principle
emerges, the right to err. According to the Committee:
The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of
an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events. 8

HRC, General Comment 34, §10. The quote continues: “Freedom to express one’s opinion
necessarily includes freedom not to express one’s opinion.” See also article 18.2 ICCPR;
HRC, General Comment 22 [on freedom of thought] (1993), §5.
7
See for a full discussion, Antoon De Baets, Responsible History (New York and Oxford:
Berghahn, 2009), chapter 5 (“The Rights to Memory and History”). The non-coercion
principle is also stated in article 18.2 ICCPR.
8
HRC, General Comment 34, §49. This right to err echoes the views of John Stuart Mill, who
in 1859 argued that erroneous and false opinions are valuable because they challenge
disbelievers to refute them in order to come closer to the truth. In the process, some of the
supposedly erroneous or false information could turn out to be true after all. John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty (London: Parker & Sons, 1859), chapter 2.
6
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This right to err refers to opinions and less so to facts. Statements of fact
are indeed distinguished from statements of opinion. From a human rights
perspective, historical facts are susceptible to a truth/falsity proof while
historical opinions are not. This distinction between facts and opinions is an
important fundament of legal epistemology. It means that expressing
opinions enjoys a far stronger protection than expressing statements of fact.

Article 19.3: The Restriction of Opinions
Article 19.3 embodies the idea that the right to freedom of expression,
although universal, is not absolute. It describes the standards to permissibly
restrict free expression.9 Four general principles underlie these standards.
First, restricting a right in order to protect it is delicate and, therefore, the
scope of restrictions on free expression is itself restricted and should never
undermine the essence of the right.10 Second, only states may permissibly
restrict free expression. Third, the exercise of the free expression right
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. This clause is first and
foremost applicable to the state. States have responsibilities to respect (that
is, not interfering with the free expression when it is not necessary), to
See for the restriction principles, in particular, United Nations (UN) Economic and Social
Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1985), part I, and Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
(A/HRC/14/23; 2010), §§72–87, especially §79. See also Toby Mendel, Restricting Freedom
of Expression: Standards and Principles (Halifax: Centre for Law and Democracy, 2011) and
“Themes and Issues,” in Information, Freedom and Censorship: World Report 1991, edited
by Article 19 (London: Library Association Publishing, 1991), 409–440, for discussion.
10
See also article 5 ICCPR.
9
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protect (that is, preventing private actors from interfering with the free
expression of others) and to fulfill (that is, facilitating free expression by
means of legal, financial, promotional and other measures). 11 Historians, in
their turn, have also duties that come with the exercise of the right to free
expression — for example, the duty not to express discriminatory views
when they act as symbols of authority in a teaching context. 12 Fourth, the
standards are applicable at all times, including times of public emergency,
although states may then take temporary measures derogating from their
responsibilities under strict conditions.13

The Three-Part Test
Based on these principles, a sophisticated method to assess the
appropriateness of restrictions on free expression was developed. It is
internationally accepted and best known as “the three-part test.” 14 The first
branch of the test prescribes that the restriction should be “provided by
law.” In order to understand this branch of the test, we should first have a
grasp of the rule of law. According to the United Nations:

See also article 2.2 ICCPR.
See HRC, Ross v Canada (736/1997) (2000), §11.6: “[T]he Committee recalls that the
exercise of … freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. These
… are of particular relevance within the school system, especially with regard to the
teaching of young students … [T]he influence exerted by school teachers may justify
restraints in order to ensure that legitimacy is not given by the school system to the
expression of views which are discriminatory.” See also European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), Gollnisch v France (48135/08) (2011), 12, 14.
13
See article 4.1 ICCPR and Siracusa Principles, part II.
14
Also called “triple test” or “justification test.”
11
12
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The “rule of law” … refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law,
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.15
A focal part of the rule of law is legality. The central idea of the legality
principle is that restrictions on free expression cannot be imposed by the
whims of a public official on the spot; they should be enshrined in preexisting laws which are consistent with international human rights standards.
Furthermore, laws imposing restrictions must be publicly accessible (they
cannot be secret), and described in clear, precise and unambiguous
language, so that everyone can understand them. They should also be
equally enforced. Laws containing vague and overbroad formulations expand
the range of persons permitted to implement them, give them too much
power, create uncertainty and arbitrariness and produce a chilling effect (a
deterring effect) on free expression.16 In its General Comment 34, the
UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies (S/2004/616) (2004), §6. See also http://un.org/en/ruleoflaw and
data.worldjusticeproject.org. The definition of rule of law is inspired by, among others,
article 8 of the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789) and Lon Fuller’s
classic The Morality of Law (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), 33–94,
discussing eight requirements for legality: generality; promulgation; non-retroactivity;
clarity; non-contradiction; capability of being obeyed; constancy through time; congruence
between law declared and law administered. About unjust laws, read Franz Kafka, The Trial
(originally in German, 1925).
16
Article 15 ICCPR emphasizes one element of the legality principle: the prohibition of
retroactive application of criminal laws (nullum crimen sine lege). No one may be convicted
for an act or an omission that did not constitute a criminal offence under national law (both
statutory and common-law norms) or international law (both treaty and customary law) at
15
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Human Rights Committee expressed concern over several law types that
may threaten free expression, including national security laws, memory
laws, blasphemy laws, hate speech laws and genocide denial laws and many
others.
It is also well-known that most dictatorships invest much energy in
keeping up a semblance of legality in a contorted attempt to enhance their
legitimacy.17 Often, they function under a martial law regime. But dictatorial
decrees do not meet the legality principle. Some blatantly prescribe an
entire ideology, others facilitate the persecution of dissidents or the ban on
their publications under the guise of national security or anti-terrorism laws.
Still others are secret laws, laws with secret interpretations or laws with
overbroad secrecy regulations or blanket amnesties granting immunity for
perpetrators of human rights violations. These unjust laws, or their
remnants, sometimes survive in democracies.
The second branch of the test enumerates a list of legitimate interests
(or aims) on which free expression restrictions can be based. These interests
can be private (the respect of the rights or reputations of others) or public
(the protection of national security, of public order, of public health and of
public morals). Among the private interests, reputation is straightforward,
the time it was committed. This means that a person may be prosecuted if accused of acts
that were criminal under international law when they were committed, even if these were
not defined as criminal under national law at the time. The latter is emphasized in article
15.2 ICCPR, according to which prosecution is possible “for any act or omission which, at
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations [italics adb].”
17
See, for example, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 130–131.
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but the catch-all expression “rights of others” is less clear. In various legal
cases, it has been understood to include, among others, the rights to
copyright, to privacy and to equality. The phrase has also been invoked to
protect the honor and dignity of genocide victims (deceased and surviving)
and their relatives and descendants.18 The “rights of others” relate to both
individuals and the community as a whole.
The public interests mentioned in article 19.3 ICCPR are generally
recognized as legitimate for the survival and functioning of society and the
state (the latter as the legal and political manifestation of society). National
security should be understood as the protection of:
[T]he existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political
independence against force or threat of force.19
This includes the possibility to shield sensitive information from the public.
Public order should ideally be:
[T]he sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set
of fundamental principles on which society is founded. Respect for
human rights is part of public order.20
The interest of public health (the third public interest) does not play a major
role in the study of the past. In contrast, the interest of public morals
certainly does. The Siracusa Principles that clarify the concept stipulate:
Since public morality varies over time and from one culture to
another, a state which invokes public morality as a ground for
See ECHR, Perinçek v Switzerland (27510/08) (2015), §§143–144, 155–157.
Siracusa Principles, §29.
20
Siracusa Principles, §22; see also ECHR, Perinçek, §§146–154.

18
19
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restricting human rights, while enjoying a certain margin of
discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the
community. The margin of discretion left to states does not apply to
the rule of non-discrimination as defined in the Covenant [the ICCPR,
adb].21
Expressing the same non-discrimination idea, the Human Rights Committee
itself observed that:
[T]he concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and
religious traditions; consequently, limitations … for the purpose of
protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving
exclusively from a single tradition.22
Significantly, the list of private and public interests is exclusive. Other
interests than the ones listed in article 19.3 are not permissible as restriction
grounds. As the Human Rights Committee tells us:
[I]t is not compatible with the Covenant for a restriction to be
enshrined in traditional, religious or other such customary law. 23
This means that free expression restrictions in the name of “tradition,”
“custom,” “culture,” or in the name of “national pride,” “protection of
memory” or “insult to the fatherland” should all be discarded as invalid. 24

Siracusa Principles, §§27−28.
HRC, General Comment 22, §8 and General Comment 34, §32.
23
HRC, General Comment 34, §24, also §32. See also Joint Declaration on Universality and
the Right to Freedom of Expression (2014), §§1b, 1f.
24
For the protection of tradition, see Graeme Reid, “The Trouble with Tradition: When
‘Values’ Trample Over Rights,” in World Report 2013, edited by Human Rights Watch
(Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 20–28. For the protection of memory, see
Article 19, Memorandum on the Russian Draft Federal Law “On Combating the Rehabilitation
of Nazism, Nazi Criminals or their Collaborators in the Newly Independent States Created on
the Territory of Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (London: Article 19, 2009), 13.

21
22
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The third branch of the test prescribes that restrictions should be
“necessary” to achieve the protection of the interests. The necessity principle
stipulates that the restriction must address a pressing social need. 25 The
proportionality principle, a part of the necessity principle, defines two other
conditions: the benefit flowing from the restriction must outweigh the harm
it does to free expression and the restriction which was selected should be
the least intrusive measure available. Restrictions that are “unnecessary” or
“disproportional” (for example, harsh sanctions) produce chilling effects that
may unduly restrict free expression of the person concerned and others. 26
The three-part test has stood the test of time. If states fail the test, a
violation of the right to free expression has occurred.

Article 20: The Prohibition of Opinions
Article 20 of ICCPR is an extension of article 19.3. Whereas article 19.3 is
about restricting opinions, article 20 is about prohibiting them. Strictly
speaking, the acts prohibited under article 20 are not even considered as
opinions. In the words of the Human Rights Committee:
[F]or the acts addressed in article 20, the Covenant indicates the
specific response required from the State: their prohibition by law. It
is only to this extent that article 20 may be considered as lex
specialis with regard to article 19.27

In Europe, the usual formula is “necessary in a democratic society.”
See also HRC, General Comment 34, §§34–35.
27
HRC, General Comment 34, §51.
25
26
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This means that governments have a duty to enact laws prohibiting war
propaganda (article 20.1 ICCPR) and laws prohibiting “any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence” (or hate speech for short) (article 20.2
ICCPR).

Epilogue
This is, in a nutshell, the international free expression framework
insofar as it is relevant for the problems of historians. The framework is a
coherent whole of fundamental principles, all of which have to be carefully
balanced against one another. It can be used to discuss those laws that
directly aim at restricting what historians say or write about the past and to
test arguments about the role of history and archives in discussions about
free expression, information and secrecy.
References
Article 19. Information, Freedom and Censorship: World Report 1991.
London: Library Association Publishing, 1991.
_____________. Memorandum on the Russian Draft Federal Law “On
Combating the Rehabilitation of Nazism, Nazi Criminals or their
Collaborators in the Newly Independent States Created on the Territory
of Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” London: Article 19, 2009.
Accessed June 19, 2016.
https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/1257/en/russia:memorandum-on-the-draft-federal-law-

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2016

13

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2016], Art. 8

Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990.
De Baets, Antoon. “Democracy and Historical Writing.” Historiografías /
Historiographies no. 9 (June 2015): 31–43. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://www.unizar.es/historiografias/numeros/9/debaets.pdf
_____________. Responsible History. New York and Oxford: Berghahn,
2009.
European Court of Human Rights. Bruno Gollnisch v France (48135/08),
2011. Accessed June 19, 2016. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001105440
____________. Perinçek v Switzerland (27510/08), 2015. Accessed June
19, 2016. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158235
Fuller, Lon. The Morality of Law. New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1964.
Kafka, Franz. The Trial. London: Secker and Warburg, 1947(originally
German, 1925).
Mendel, Toby. 2011. Restricting Freedom of Expression: Standards and
Principles. Halifax: Centre for Law and Democracy. Accessed Sepetmber
29, 2016. http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/Paper-on-Restrictions.10.03.22.rev_.pdf
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: Parker & Sons, 1859.
National Assembly of France. Declaration of the Rights of Man (Déclaration
des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen. 1789. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp
Reid, Graeme. 2013. “The Trouble With Tradition: When ‘Values’ Trample
Over Rights,” in World Report 2013, edited by Human Rights Watch,
20–28. Washington: Human Rights Watch. Accessed June 19, 2016.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss1/8
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2016.010108

14

De Baets: A Historian's View

United Nations. United Nations and the Rule of Law. Accessed June 19,
2016. http://un.org/en/ruleoflaw
United Nations Economic and Social Council. Siracusa Principles on the
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex. 1985. Accessed June
19, 2016. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu//instree/siracusaprinciples.html
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
General Comment 10 on Freedom of Expression. June 29, 1983.
Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralComme
ntNo10.pdf
____________. General Comment 11 on Prohibition of Propaganda for
War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious Hatred. July 29, 1983.
Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralComme
ntNo11.pdf
___________. General Comment 22 on Freedom of Thought, Article 18.
1993. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom22.htm
___________. General Comment 34 on the Freedoms of Opinion and
Expression. September 12, 2011. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf
___________. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
December 16, 1966. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
___________. Malcom Ross v. Canada. Communication No. 736/1997,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000). Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu//undocs/736-1997.html
___________. Ratification, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Accessed June 19, 2016. http://indicators.ohchr.org

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2016

15

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2016], Art. 8

___________. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression.
A/HRC/14/23, April 20, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.
14.23.pdf
United Nations Security Council. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. S/2004/616, 2004. Accessed
June 19, 2016. http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression,Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Representative on Freedom of the Media, Organization of American
States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Joint Declaration on
Universality and the Right to Freedom of Expression. May 6, 2014.
Accessed June 19, 2016. http://www.osce.org/fom/118298
World Justice Project. Rule of Law Index. Accessed June 19, 2016.
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org

Biographical note
Antoon De Baets (Ph.D. 1988) is professor of History, Ethics and Human
Rights by Special Appointment of the Foundation EUROCLIO at the University
of Groningen, the Netherlands. He wrote 175 publications, mainly on the
censorship of history and the ethics of historians. His work includes several
books, the latest of which in English is Responsible History (New York and
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009). Since 1995, he has coordinated the
Network of Concerned Historians. Furthermore, he is working on such issues
as the relationship between historical writing and democracy; historians and
archivists killed for political reasons; the subversive power of historical
parallels; post-conflict history textbooks moratoria; posthumous privacy and
reputation; intergenerational awareness; iconoclastic breaks with the past;
academic freedom; history-related complaints before the United Nations; the
legal framework of historical writing; and a theory of free expression about
the past.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss1/8
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2016.010108

16

